Whether a system is conscious depends on features of its internal processes, not merely its behavior or capabilities.

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• A system is conscious if it implements self-organized second-order perception that increases global coherenceclaim0.824
  CIMC's current operational definition, precise enough to generate predictions while subject to revision
• It is basically impossible to determine if a computer program generates conscious experience by merely observing its performance; a test for consciousness must take internal structure into account.claim0.811
  Paper's argument against behavioral tests for consciousness, establishing why MCH requires internal analysis
• All cognitive systems have some degree of consciousness.hypothesis0.808
  Gradualism implies that if brains are conscious, so are other tissues with similar mechanisms.
• Can computers be conscious? Or more specifically, can today's computers fully emulate the way in which organisms compute minds?question0.804
  Central research question motivating the entire paper
• Can implementation of the specific features of consciousness contribute to the capabilities, reliability, or safety of AI systems?question0.801
  Outstanding question linking consciousness research to AI design goals
• Indicators based on potential background conditions for consciousness should be included to mitigate the narrow focus of theories on distinguishing conscious from unconscious states in humans.claim0.795
  Third guideline for deriving indicators; justifies PP-1 and AE-1/AE-2
• Are all cognitive systems conscious?question0.795
  TAME's implication that the continuum extends to consciousness.
• Living processes are based necessarily on deep feeling.claim0.794