Indicators based on potential background conditions for consciousness should be included to mitigate the narrow focus of theories on distinguishing conscious from unconscious states in humans.

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• Indicators used to assess AI systems for consciousness should focus on theories' central explanatory posits, abstracting away from implementation details that may differ across systems.claim0.850
  First of four guidelines for deriving indicators; prevents over-restriction to human-specific features
• Because no one theory of consciousness is currently dominant, assessments of AI systems should draw on multiple theories and treat their conditions as indicators rather than definitive criteria.claim0.826
  Justifies the multi-theory indicator approach rather than committing to a single theory
• Even if a case successfully meets all three criteria, this does not necessarily indicate that the corresponding sequence of representations is conscious. Rather, it suggests the observation of a potential 'consciousness' phenomenon within these representations — nothing more.quote0.820
  Load-bearing epistemic caution the author places on the entire analytical framework.
• It is basically impossible to determine if a computer program generates conscious experience by merely observing its performance; a test for consciousness must take internal structure into account.claim0.806
  Paper's argument against behavioral tests for consciousness, establishing why MCH requires internal analysis
• The features emphasized by theories of consciousness are not unique to brains.claim0.806
  The core argument that ToC functional principles do not pick out brains as a privileged substrate for inner perspective.
• Superficial behavioral indicators of consciousness are especially vulnerable to the gaming problem in AI contexts because engineers can design non-conscious systems that manifest them.claim0.804
  Further motivation for preferring internal computational indicators over behavioral ones
• In its minimal state, conscious experience may contain nothing but the bare registration of its own occurrence, requiring only that the perceptual process is present within the field it createsclaim0.804
  CIMC's account of minimal phenomenal experience as the target for research and construction
• Consciousness remains without an agreed scientific characterization, without a validated theory connecting mechanism to experience, and without criteria for establishing its presence or absence in any systemclaim0.803
  CIMC's characterization of the current state of the field motivating its research program