A system is conscious if it implements self-organized second-order perception that increases global coherence

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Consciousness is not the global broadcast itself but the second-order perception that orchestrates coherence across representations competing for and achieving global accessclaim0.816
  CIMC's differentiation of its account from GWT: it explains the dynamics underlying GWT rather than equating consciousness with broadcast
• All cognitive systems have some degree of consciousness.hypothesis0.810
  Gradualism implies that if brains are conscious, so are other tissues with similar mechanisms.
• Consciousness is the ground of reality, not an emergent property, so artificial systems participate in it genuinely.claim0.809
• Consciousness is dynamic and creative, not passive awareness—mapping well to active AI system behavior.claim0.807
• Consciousness is not prediction error resolution as such but the second-order perception that orchestrates coherence across models being maintained and updatedclaim0.801
  CIMC's differentiation from predictive processing: specifying which pattern within predictive processing constitutes consciousness
• Consciousness functions as a coherence-maximizing pattern, minimizing constraint violations between simultaneously active partial models of reality in working memory and perceptual space.claim0.793
  Paper's functional definition of consciousness, based on von der Malsburg's coherence definition
• Are all cognitive systems conscious?question0.793
  TAME's implication that the continuum extends to consciousness.
• Consciousness, phenomenologically understood, is second-order perception: not just registration of content, but the additional perception that perception is taking place.claim0.792
  Paper's core phenomenological definition of consciousness