claim
active
claim:the-i-itself-this-thing-which-seems-so-rarified-so-philosophical-and-which-somehow-has-a-religious-origin-is-also-entirely-personal-in-natureThe I itself—this thing which seems so rarified, so philosophical and which somehow has a religious origin—is also entirely personal in nature.
The claim that the transcendent ground of existence is accessed through the most direct, childish, personal making.
Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count
Concepts (2)
concept
- The I (Great Self)associated_withThe transcendent ground of all existence, the eternal self within each person, to which we appeal when judging living structure and which is revealed when we truly please ourselves.
- Childlike Innocenceassociated_withThe state of pure, unselfconscious making where one pleases oneself absolutely, free from rules and concepts—the closest we can come to the egoless state.
Claims (1)
claim
- The startling conclusion that the deep structure of space is simultaneously the most intimate, vulnerable, personal thing.
Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- The three qualities of the I: personal, one, suffused with relatedness.
- Minimal conclusion that at least one of the two versions of the I-hypothesis must be true.
- Alexander's core metaphysical proposal introduced in §8.
- Opening question of the chapter, seeking the physical nature of the experienced unity.
- Access to the deepest self is dependent on the maker expressing their own feeling, not intellectual concepts.
- The single blinding unity, the ground of being, which living centers connect us to.
- Central metaphysical concept of the chapter: the universal ground of selfhood that living centers reflect and connect to; what makers must yearn toward to produce living structure.