Capacity for care constitutes self in absence of permanent substance

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• A system's capacity for care constitutes its self in the absence of permanent substance or essence.claim0.883
  Foundational to selfless-self model; self defined by scope and nature of goals pursued, not by enduring essence.
• A system’s capacity for care—its concern for the alleviation of homeostatic stress—can be seen as constituting its self in the absence of any permanent substance or essence.claim0.793
  Re-defines self in terms of care dynamics.
• There are no a priori limits on a self's perceptions of stress and thus no limits on capacity for care and intelligent response.hypothesis0.750
  Predicts that collective, dynamic nature of intelligent agents enables open-ended evolution without fixed essence.
• What if these capacities are insufficient for moral patienthood?question0.742
  Exploration of uncertainty about normative bases.
• Multiple regions of the soma and body components may possess consciousness and deserve care equivalent to the verbal self.claim0.742
  Extends care beyond artificial boundaries of physiological continuity or verbal reportability.
• Intelligence per se remains a mere capacity – the state of being competent with regards to noticing and overcoming stress – intelligence requires care to be engaged and expressed.claim0.739
  Distinguishing intelligence as capacity from its expression.
• The conditions sufficient for autonomy do not entail a capacity for affective states.claim0.738
  Second premise showing autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.
• There are no a priori limits on perception of stress or corresponding capacity for care; successful stress-relief reveals novel problem spaces at different scales.claim0.738