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Marks, Samuel

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Authored papers (3)

  • A single LLM trained to read injected residual-stream activations and answer arbitrary natural-language questions about them can audit fine-tuned models it never saw during training. Activation Oracles (AOs), the instrument introduced here, are initialized as a copy of the target model and receive activations by summing them into the layer-1 residual stream at placeholder tokens. They are trained by supervised fine-tuning on three data sources: System Prompt QA from Pan et al. (2024), 7 binary classification tasks recast as yes/no questions, and self-supervised context prediction of preceding or following text. Trained only on the original models, AOs match or exceed the best prior method on 3 of 4 auditing tasks. Three are the Cywiński et al. secret-elicitation tasks, including Taboo, and one is the Minder et al. emergent-misalignment task, where the AO explains an activation difference between the fine-tuned and original model. The exception is Secret Side Constraint, where black-box prompting already elicits the secret. Across Qwen-3 8B, Gemma-2 9B, Llama-3.3 70B and Claude Haiku 3.5, performance rises with both training-data quantity and diversity. The Taboo evaluation was replicated on Qwen3-8B. AOs are non-exhaustive, may confabulate, and cost multiple forward passes per query. The implication is that activation interpretation can be framed as a scalable, bitter-lesson-style supervised problem, one that complements mechanistic methods such as SAEs and does not replace them.

  • Gains on the sparsity-fidelity frontier do not predict how well a sparse autoencoder performs on downstream tasks, and SAEBench demonstrates this by scoring over 200 SAEs on eight metrics. Matryoshka BatchTopK SAEs rank below TopK and BatchTopK on loss recovered, yet they take the best score on Absorption, RAVEL, Sparse Probing, SCR and TPP, which is 5 of 8 metrics, in the typical L0 range of 40-200. Matryoshka is also the only architecture whose disentanglement scores improve when width grows from 4k to 16k to 65k latents on Gemma-2-2B (layer 12). The other architectures show inverse scaling on absorption and SCR, and the effect persists when the number of ablated latents is held fixed. SAEBench combines four capability groups (concept detection, interpretability, reconstruction, feature disentanglement). It adds two novel zero-ablation metrics, Spurious Correlation Removal and Targeted Probe Perturbation, and it extends the absorption metric to partial and shared absorption. The suite covers seven architectures (ReLU, TopK, BatchTopK, Gated, JumpReLU, P-annealing, Matryoshka), Gemma-2-2B and Pythia-160M, and Gemma-Scope SAEs up to 1M latents. Hierarchical architectures beat the rest by 30-40% on SCR and absorption. No single L0 wins everywhere, though L0 of 50-150 is a reasonable compromise. The implication is that SAE progress needs a multi-metric benchmark, and that optimizing reconstruction at fixed sparsity can hide failures in concept isolation, which grow with scale. The paper declines to combine the metrics into one score.

  • Contrastive activation steering can suppress evaluation-awareness and elicit genuine deployment behavior from a deliberately trained model organism, not merely silence verbalizations of being tested. Working with Llama 3.3 Nemotron Super 49B, the authors trained an evaluation-aware model using a two-step pipeline—synthetic document fine-tuning (SDF) on 115.6 million tokens followed by four rounds of expert iteration on 41,290 examples—that causes the model to write Python type hints 80–86% of the time in evaluation contexts while writing them only 33% of the time in true deployment contexts. A fictional evaluation company cue ('Wood Labs') was embedded as an adversarial test: even when user prompts explicitly claimed deployment, the Wood Labs system prompt maintained type hint rates above 80%, and simply concatenating all 16 contrastive prompt pairs as text failed to reduce that rate to deployment levels. The method introduced—contrastive activation steering extracted from the pre-fine-tuned base model using 16 deployment/evaluation prompt pairs applied at layers 10, 14, 18, 22, 26, and 30 with scaling factor 0.6—reduced type hint rates to below 11% even with the evaluation cue present, while random Gaussian steering vectors of matched norm produced no comparable suppression. Crucially, the steering vector was extracted before any fine-tuning, making it implausible that it directly encodes type-hint information; it can only work by modifying the model's contextual beliefs, a mechanism corroborated by GPT-5-graded reasoning traces showing a strong correlation between steered deployment beliefs and reduced type hint rates. The paper argues this validates activation steering as a tool for AI evaluators to uncover deployment behavior during safety-critical evaluations, including honeypot scenarios designed to detect sandbagging and alignment faking.

More papers — OpenAlex / S2

Co-authors (12)