You will come to feel that by refusing to entertain a simple hypothesis that explains everything - sensitivity as a property common to all matter or as a result of the organization of matter - you are flying in the face of common sense and plunging into a chasm of mysteries, contradictions and absurdities.

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• Sensitivity as a property common to all matter or as a result of the organization of matter (Diderot's hypothesis).hypothesis0.833
  A simple hypothesis that explains everything, contrasted with the mechanistic view that creates mysteries.
• "[W]e must confess that perception, and what depends upon it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons... we will find only parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception."quote0.807
  Load-bearing quote from Monadology §17 providing earliest clear statement of the Hard Problem
• "[W]e must confess that perception, and what depends upon it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons... when inspecting its interior, we will find only parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception."quote0.806
  Canonical illustration of the Hard Problem intuition that any functional/mechanical explanation faces an explanatory gap for perception
• If someone develops clear enough introspection, they will eventually conclude that thought is rendered as subtle perturbations in phenomenal fields.hypothesis0.776
  Cube Flipper's prediction about convergence of insight practice on field model.
• "The obvious inability of present-day physics and chemistry to account for such events is no reason at all for doubting that they can be accounted for by those sciences."concept0.771
  Load-bearing epistemological statement; Schrödinger argues that current ignorance does not imply impossibility—motivates search for deeper theory.
• It is hard to coherently deny functionalism in any reasonable theory of consciousness, since any theory must tie consciousness to certain configurations, which smuggles functionalism back in.claim0.768
  Paper's argument that all viable theories of consciousness implicitly rely on structural-functional criteria
• This theory doesn't have to correspond exactly to human behavior or social customs; we only need analogs useful for program correctness.claim0.766
  The speech act theory for programming can be simpler than human models.
• Individual mechanical explanations for each property are too specific to provide a general explanation for why living structure repeatedly appears across all domains.claim0.766
  Alexander's argument that case-by-case mechanical explanations fail to address the universal recurrence of living structure