Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get enormously greater sums of utility from any sacrifice of others than these others lose.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• While non-utilitarians may fancy themselves immune to the utility monster challenge, most reasonable views are in fact susceptible to various degreesclaim0.789
  Key argument that digital super-beneficiaries present a challenge across ethical theories, not only for utilitarianism
• Utilitarian Theoryframework0.783
  The primary ethical framework under which super-beneficiaries generate dominant resource claims
• Utilitarianismframework0.732
  Ethical theory emphasizing beneficence for sentient beings; contrasted with Kantianism.
• acting to optimize value and perception are two aspects of exactly the same principle; namely the minimisation of a quantity [free energy] that bounds the probability of sensory input, given a particular agent or phenotype.quote0.729
  Concise statement of the free-energy principle's unification of action and perception.
• Acting to maximize value is the same as acting to minimize surprise; value is simply the probability of sensory input expected by an agent.claim0.726
  Reinterprets classical reward/value concepts through free energy lens.
• Expected Utility Theoryframework0.725
  Economic framework for decision-making under risk.
• "It is certainly very hard, and perhaps impossible, for mere humans to anticipate and rule out in advance all the disastrous ways the machine could choose to achieve a specified objective."quote0.720
  Russell's statement opening Section 2 articulating the core motivation for the Contemplative AI approach
• If welfare grows more slowly than cost with mind scale, greatest total welfare would be obtained by building vast numbers of tiny minds, implying insect populations may already overwhelm humans in aggregate welfarehypothesis0.719
  One of two scaling hypotheses examined for the mind-scale dimension