How do higher-order entities (organisms, organs, tissues, etc.) distort the energy landscape for their subunits?

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Higher-order entities distort the energy landscape for their subunits, benefiting from their competencies to navigate spaces of which the subunits are unaware.claim0.906
  Explains how top-down causation leverages lower-level problem-solving for large-scale goals.
• Target morphology shifts occur despite the fact that all of the individual cells have unaltered normal genomes, showing that competent subunits can be pushed to implement diverse organism-scale goals by physiological signals.claim0.767
  Highlights the non-genetic control of large-scale anatomy.
• An organism maintains its orderliness by continually extracting order from its environment, which it accomplishes by feeding on negative entropy.claim0.763
  Schrödinger's central claim about how life evades thermodynamic equilibrium.
• The larger task of making these processes genuinely morphogenetic so that they generate deeper and more coherent living structure—still lies on the horizon.claim0.760
• Can events within living organisms be accounted for by physics and chemistry?question0.749
  Foundational question of the book; Schrödinger's answer: yes, but requires quantum mechanics, not classical physics.
• Organised structure of relationships between component parts causes them to work together, creating new organismic entity and evolutionary unitclaim0.741
• Free-energy scaling under domain-wall formation in Potts, autoregressive, and hierarchical networks shows that combinatorics of interactions on a graph prevent or allow spontaneous ordering.finding0.740
  Core result demonstrating topological constraints on self-organization
• Individual mechanical explanations for each property are too specific to provide a general explanation for why living structure repeatedly appears across all domains.claim0.740
  Alexander's argument that case-by-case mechanical explanations fail to address the universal recurrence of living structure