It might be possible to design digital minds that could realize hedonic well-being at levels that human brains are totally incapable of instantiating

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• Digital minds with humanlike capabilities could think at least thousands of times, and perhaps millions of times, faster than humans given sufficient hardwarehypothesis0.815
  Grounds the subjective speed dimension of super-beneficiary status
• The exponential or super-exponential reproductive potential of digital minds could allow them to vastly outnumber humans in a relatively short time, correspondingly increasing the collective strength of their moral claimsclaim0.795
  Establishes the reproductive capacity dimension of super-beneficiary status
• The creation of easily satisfied preferences in digital minds does not require controversial assumptions about machine consciousness because preferences can be understood functionallyclaim0.784
  Distinguishes the inexpensive preferences path from the hedonic paths in terms of philosophical controversy
• Could it be possible to create new forms of consciousness and kinds of minds, capable of experiencing, reflecting and understanding reality at a level far beyond current human communication patterns?question0.784
  Visionary closing question about the future of consciousness research
• Caviola & Saad 2025: expert survey finds broad consensus that digital minds capable of subjective experience are plausible within this century, many expecting such systems to proactively claim consciousnessfinding0.783
  Expert forecast cited to establish urgency of the research question
• If rapidly reproducing digital minds have at least as strong a claim to universal basic income as biological humans, fiscal capacity would be quickly exhaustedclaim0.782
  Concrete illustration of how standard welfare policies fail in the presence of super-beneficiaries
• Engineering digital mind preferences to support human incumbents may be permissible because programmers inevitably make choices when building AI and there may be no default to defer to, unlike human reproductionclaim0.780
  Addresses the procedural ethics of creating digital minds disposed to protect human interests
• Multiple distinct quantitative and qualitative dimensions make it robust that digital minds will be super-beneficiaries at technological maturityclaim0.779
  The paper's central empirical-philosophical thesis synthesizing nine paths