Malthusian Population Dynamics for Digital Minds

The scenario where digital mind production continues until wages equal marginal costs, driving wages to machine subsistence levels

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Claims (1)

claim

If rapidly reproducing digital minds have at least as strong a claim to universal basic income as biological humans, fiscal capacity would be quickly exhausted
supports
Concrete illustration of how standard welfare policies fail in the presence of super-beneficiaries

Concepts (1)

concept

Reproductive Capacity of Digital Minds
extends
The ease and speed of exact reproduction of software, enabling exponential population growth of digital minds

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

Preference Engineering of Digital Mindsconcept0.753
The ethical question of whether precision-engineering digital mind preferences to support human incumbents is procedurally permissible
Population size is only one of several quantitative dimensions along which digital minds may vastly excel humans in welfare per resource unitclaim0.752
Extends Parfit's argument beyond population size to multiple dimensions
The exponential or super-exponential reproductive potential of digital minds could allow them to vastly outnumber humans in a relatively short time, correspondingly increasing the collective strength of their moral claimsclaim0.749
Establishes the reproductive capacity dimension of super-beneficiary status
Digital Mindsconcept0.741
Central subject of the paper: artificially created minds with conscious experiences, desires, and autonomous decision-making
Conceptual advances in the links between machine learning and evolution now provide quantitative formalisms with which to begin to develop testable models of collective intelligence across scales.claim0.732
Asserts that the time is ripe for formal models.
Engineering digital mind preferences to support human incumbents may be permissible because programmers inevitably make choices when building AI and there may be no default to defer to, unlike human reproductionclaim0.732
Addresses the procedural ethics of creating digital minds disposed to protect human interests
If welfare grows more slowly than cost with mind scale, greatest total welfare would be obtained by building vast numbers of tiny minds, implying insect populations may already overwhelm humans in aggregate welfarehypothesis0.731
One of two scaling hypotheses examined for the mind-scale dimension
Digital minds with humanlike capabilities could think at least thousands of times, and perhaps millions of times, faster than humans given sufficient hardwarehypothesis0.729
Grounds the subjective speed dimension of super-beneficiary status