Population size is only one of several quantitative dimensions along which digital minds may vastly excel humans in welfare per resource unit

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• The claim that human-sized minds are optimal for generating welfare per resource unit may seem a little suspicious absent further justification, since the scaling relationship is unlikely to have a peak at human mind sizeclaim0.813
  Supports the mind-scale dimension of super-beneficiary status
• The exponential or super-exponential reproductive potential of digital minds could allow them to vastly outnumber humans in a relatively short time, correspondingly increasing the collective strength of their moral claimsclaim0.770
  Establishes the reproductive capacity dimension of super-beneficiary status
• If welfare grows more slowly than cost with mind scale, greatest total welfare would be obtained by building vast numbers of tiny minds, implying insect populations may already overwhelm humans in aggregate welfarehypothesis0.767
  One of two scaling hypotheses examined for the mind-scale dimension
• Reproductive Capacity of Digital Mindsconcept0.761
  The ease and speed of exact reproduction of software, enabling exponential population growth of digital minds
• If rapidly reproducing digital minds have at least as strong a claim to universal basic income as biological humans, fiscal capacity would be quickly exhaustedclaim0.752
  Concrete illustration of how standard welfare policies fail in the presence of super-beneficiaries
• Malthusian Population Dynamics for Digital Mindsconcept0.752
  The scenario where digital mind production continues until wages equal marginal costs, driving wages to machine subsistence levels
• Human cognition evolved to detect agency in medium-sized objects at medium speeds in 3D space, limiting recognition of intelligence in unfamiliar substrates.claim0.741
• Intelligence and cognition exist on a continuum; modern bioscience offers no support for clean bright-line distinctions between cognitive and non-cognitive beings.claim0.740
  Anti-essentialism claim: questions like 'is it cognitive?' are scientifically unjustified; modern view must ask 'what kind' and 'how much'.