We do not claim to measure consciousness; the battery measures a reproducible, prompt-sensitive reflective mode.

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• The koan battery measures a reproducible, prompt-sensitive reflective mode — not consciousness — defined as uncertainty-tolerant, non-defensive engagement with questions about one's own processing.claim0.872
  Core epistemic claim bounding the paper's contribution
• Consciousness is a phenomenon we have partial sensors for; building better sensors is a research and engineering question.claim0.795
• Our central claim is deliberately limited. We do not claim that these models have conscious felt experience, nor that a numeric self-report gives direct access to anything like human phenomenology.quote0.776
  Explicit scope delimitation that situates the paper's claims within interpretability rather than consciousness science
• There exists no viable behavioral test for consciousness analogous to the Turing Test for intelligence, because consciousness is a particular internal way to achieve performance, not externally visible performance itself.claim0.775
  Paper identifies as a research gap requiring internal analysis methods rather than behavioral benchmarks
• We take our principal contributions in this report to be: 1. Showing that the assessment of consciousness in AI is scientifically tractable ... 2. Proposing a rubric for assessing consciousness in AI ... 3. Providing initial evidence that many of the indicator properties can be implemented in AI systems using current techniques ...quote0.771
  Summary of contributions.
• Tests of performance on specific tasks, including language modeling, are insufficient for determining consciousness statusclaim0.771
  Systems directly optimized for output can produce it without the prerequisite processes for conscious experience; simplest explanation for LLM consciousness reports is pattern matching
• Consciousness in AI is best assessed by drawing on neuroscientific theories of consciousness.claim0.768
  Central methodological claim of the paper.
• It is basically impossible to determine if a computer program generates conscious experience by merely observing its performance; a test for consciousness must take internal structure into account.claim0.767
  Paper's argument against behavioral tests for consciousness, establishing why MCH requires internal analysis