Under the Dependent Origination Axiom, the phenomenal category P has no terminal object.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Under the Dependent Origination Axiom, no object in the phenomenal category possesses svabhāva (its representable functor is never isomorphic to a constant functor).claim0.846
  Proposition 4.1, category-theoretic elucidation of śūnyatā.
• Whatever is dependently co-arisen, that is explained to be emptiness.quote0.780
  Nāgārjuna's MMK 24.18, the ontological link between dependent origination and śūnyatā.
• The functionalist denies the coherence of philosophical zombies: experience, insofar as it has any determinable character, is itself a functional propertyclaim0.766
  Core argument against essentialism: there is no property of consciousness over and above its functional manifestations
• Functional and phenomenal introspection are distinguishable, and whether they correlate in machines is an open question.claim0.762
  Core conceptual distinction introduced at the start; defines the paper's central problem.
• Buddhist phenomenology's careful attention to dependent origination makes tanha-like building blocks particularly likely to have simple, elegant neural implementations.claim0.746
  Argues that Buddhist analysis primes us to find clean neural mechanisms.
• Crump et al. (2022) offer a well-argued example of an essential development: a rigorous framework for assessing sentience from the perspective of moral concern over an agent's welfare.claim0.743
  Levin's endorsement of the target paper's contribution.
• The structures where life occurs just cannot be made in any other way — it is a categorical and mathematical must.claim0.740
• The paper does not claim enlightenment is reducible to mathematical structure; phenomenological experience belongs to a different order of description.claim0.736
  Proposition 3, explicit anti-reductionist stance.