The Humean theory of motivation is compatible with the possibility of autonomous agents who lack affective states.

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• Humean Theory of Motivationframework0.882
  The view that motivating reasons consist of a desire and a means-end belief; desires and beliefs are distinct existences.
• Future AI systems could be rational autonomous agents without affective consciousness.claim0.750
  Practical significance: possible near-future non-sentient autonomous AI.
• There are plausible views (e.g., global workspace theory, higher-order theory) on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness.claim0.747
  Tentative conclusion on the autonomy-consciousness link.
• Agents and their interactions are intrinsic to studying information flow in computation, not peripheral to classical information theory.claim0.727
  Central thesis: traditional static information theories fail to capture dynamic interaction necessary for understanding modern computing.
• The elimination of reward as a motivator of behavior with prior beliefs dissolves the tautology of reinforcement learning (rewards reinforce behaviors that secure rewards).claim0.727
  §4 Discussion.
• The conditions sufficient for autonomy do not entail a capacity for affective states.claim0.722
  Second premise showing autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity.
• Whether a state is rewarding (or not) is a function of the agent themselves, and not the environment.claim0.722
  §1, contrasting RL reward conceptualization.
• If AI systems could experience happiness and suffering and set and pursue their own goals based on their own beliefs and desires, then they would very plausibly merit moral consideration.hypothesis0.720
  Joint sufficiency of consciousness and robust agency.