Living things model themselves as agents because tracking microstates is impractical for survival, committing organisms to an agency-first view of the world from the microbial stage.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• In this loop, humans and technology both contribute as agents, and their capacity for care and intelligence can be observed and tracked by focusing on the transfers of their stresses.quote0.789
  Describes the dual SCI loop perspective.
• The living organism seems to be a macroscopic system which in part of its behaviour approaches that purely mechanical (as contrasted with thermodynamical) conduct to which all systems tend as the temperature approaches absolute zero.claim0.781
  Schrödinger's analogy highlighting that life maintains order akin to a system at very low temperature.
• Living processes are by nature morphogenetic; they are aimed at creating positive space and making form coherent.claim0.781
  Core definition of living process as intentionally form-creating, in contrast to fragmented modern processes.
• Mind precedes and is a superset of life; 'living' things are simply very good at scaling up parts' lowly competencies into aligned collective intelligencesclaim0.779
  Reframes the traditional life/mind hierarchy, supporting panpsychist implications.
• Agents perceive by minimizing variational free energy to ensure model consistency with past observations and act by minimizing expected free energy to make future sensations consistent with preferences.claim0.779
  Formalization of perception-action cycle integrating inference and decision-making.
• 'Machines' and living organisms belong on the same spectrum because both can draw on ingressing forms to get more out than was put inclaim0.778
  Key implication drawn from the sorting-algorithm and biobot evidence.
• Biology commits to optimizing salience and meaning, not fidelity, via high-level, agent-based interpretation.claim0.778
  Central claim that biological memory prioritizes gestalt over details.
• Selves are not fixed permanent agents; the substrate of memory, preferences, and rewards is plastic and can remodel during the agent's lifetime.claim0.771
  Central claim that cognitive Selves change in real-time, supported by examples of metamorphosis and regeneration.