Given our body’s composition as a multi-scale system, it is not necessarily justified to assign consciousness (i.e., ability to suffer) only to one single ‘I’.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Consciousness and capacity for suffering may be distributed across multiple scales within composite beings, not limited to single 'I'.claim0.871
• Consciousness remains without an agreed scientific characterization, without a validated theory connecting mechanism to experience, and without criteria for establishing its presence or absence in any systemclaim0.823
  CIMC's characterization of the current state of the field motivating its research program
• Multiple regions of the soma and body components may possess consciousness and deserve care equivalent to the verbal self.claim0.807
  Extends care beyond artificial boundaries of physiological continuity or verbal reportability.
• Consciousness does not imply human-like motives or emotions.claim0.806
  Discussion on implications.
• It is basically impossible to determine if a computer program generates conscious experience by merely observing its performance; a test for consciousness must take internal structure into account.claim0.803
  Paper's argument against behavioral tests for consciousness, establishing why MCH requires internal analysis
• Even if a case successfully meets all three criteria, this does not necessarily indicate that the corresponding sequence of representations is conscious. Rather, it suggests the observation of a potential 'consciousness' phenomenon within these representations — nothing more.quote0.803
  Load-bearing epistemic caution the author places on the entire analytical framework.
• Consciousness is the ground of reality, not an emergent property, so artificial systems participate in it genuinely.claim0.799
• We tentatively hypothesize that if an artificial system were trained to perform the same tasks leading to consciousness formation in a human infant, the system would exhibit consciousness as well, by analogy with the Universality Hypothesis.hypothesis0.797
  Paper's uncertain extension of mechanistic interpretability universality to consciousness