claim

active

claim:consciousness-ability-to-suffer-should-not-be-assigned-only-to-one-singular-i-but-distributed-across-multiscale-body-components

Consciousness (ability to suffer) should not be assigned only to one singular 'I' but distributed across multiscale body components.

Source paper

extracted_from

Toward an ethics of autopoietic technology: Stress, care, and intelligence

(2023) · Witkowski, Olaf · Doctor, Thomas · Solomonova, Elizaveta · Duane, Bill +1

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

Communities (3)

community

Collective intelligence & distributed cognition
members_of
All minds are composites of parts; individual and collective intelligence unified under substrate-neutral principles.
Substrate-independent cognition & consciousness
members_of
Gradualist, substrate-neutral frameworks extending cognition and sentience across biological and artificial networks.
Distributed agency and multiscale consciousness
members_of
Reframes consciousness and agency as distributed across biological scales (cells, organs, organisms) rather than unified in individual minds, emphasizing problem-solving competence at all levels.

Claims (1)

claim

Given our body’s composition as a multi-scale system, it is not necessarily justified to assign consciousness (i.e., ability to suffer) only to one single ‘I’.
restates
Argues for distributed consciousness, supporting extension of care.

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

Consciousness and capacity for suffering may be distributed across multiple scales within composite beings, not limited to single 'I'.claim0.888
Consciousness likely distributed across multiscale body components, not localized to brainclaim0.827
Organs and tissues employ identical mechanisms as brain; lack of direct verbal report does not negate consciousness in body components.
Multiple regions of the soma and body components may possess consciousness and deserve care equivalent to the verbal self.claim0.824
Extends care beyond artificial boundaries of physiological continuity or verbal reportability.
Consciousness features occur substrate-neutrally across brains, unconventional embodiments, and information-processing systems.claim0.816
Consciousness is prior to and independent of personal ownership or individual minds.claim0.814
Consciousness is not the result of mental architecture and cognitive ability, but its prerequisite — a necessary precondition for complex learning and intelligent behavior.claim0.807
Genesis Hypothesis claim that consciousness forms before rather than from cognition
Consciousness is a phenomenon we have partial sensors for; building better sensors is a research and engineering question.claim0.806
Consciousness remains without an agreed scientific characterization, without a validated theory connecting mechanism to experience, and without criteria for establishing its presence or absence in any systemclaim0.806
CIMC's characterization of the current state of the field motivating its research program

Cross-corpus bridges (5)

same_concept_as · Nomic cosine

External markdown files that talk about the same concept as this entity.

aboutblank_kb
How does the multiscale, nested architecture of consciousness within a single body change our understanding of consciousness and moral consideration?questions/how-does-the-multiscale-nested-architecture-of-consciousness.md0.824
aboutblank_kb
Consciousnessconcepts/cognitive/consciousness.md0.805
aboutblank_kb
How far down the scale of biological organization do concepts like sentience, suffering, agency, and moral consideration extend?questions/how-far-down-the-scale-of-biological-organization.md0.799
aboutblank_kb
Me Versus Weconcepts/interdisciplinary/me-versus-we.md0.787
aboutblank_kb
What defines a self in the context of chimeric and bioengineered beings with mixed component origins?questions/what-defines-a-self-in-the-context-of.md0.785

Restated by (1)

cosine ≥ 0.90

Other entities that say roughly the same thing. May be merge candidates or independent restatements across papers.

claim
Given our body’s composition as a multi-scale system, it is not necessarily justified to assign consciousness (i.e., ability to suffer) only to one single ‘I’.