Free will is not metaphysical indeterminism but the agent's capacity to maintain multiple attractors and resist lock-in.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Free Will and Agencyconcept0.783
• There are metaphysically and/or nomologically possible beings who fall outside the scope of the morality of humanity and are protected only by the morality of respect.claim0.762
  Existence of autonomous non-welfare subjects with moral standing via respect.
• There are no permanent or indivisible agents; the actual nonexistence of singular and enduring individuality must be accounted for in any model of agency.claim0.755
  Fundamental ontological claim underlying the selfless self model.
• Life is not a mechanical property but an inherent attribute of space itself, analogous to Maxwell's electromagnetic field creating light.claim0.752
  Proposition 1 of the Mid-Book Appendix; the most fundamental metaphysical claim of the theory.
• "There is no truly monadic, indivisible yet cognitive being: all known minds reside in physical systems composed of components of various complexity and active behavior."concept0.749
• Agents perceive by minimizing variational free energy to ensure model consistency with past observations and act by minimizing expected free energy to make future sensations consistent with preferences.claim0.744
  Formalization of perception-action cycle integrating inference and decision-making.
• "To see the phenomenal world fully from the perspective of both freedom and the lack of separateness between oneself and others is to see it also with an irrationally openhearted warmth..."quote0.739
  Eleanor Rosch quote connecting non-dual perspective to compassion, opening Section 5.3
• There is no truly monadic, indivisible yet cognitive being.claim0.737
  All known minds reside in composite physical systems.