Consciousness is experienced as fields (visual, somatic) with wave-like dynamics; Gabor wavelets may underlie the spatiotemporal rendering of experience.

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• Consciousness features occur substrate-neutrally across brains, unconventional embodiments, and information-processing systems.claim0.812
• Consciousness is always happening now — it constitutes what we experience as the immediate present; its minimal state contains only the presence of consciousness itself.claim0.801
  Paper's phenomenological claim about the temporal character of consciousness
• Consciousness is the ground of reality, not an emergent property, so artificial systems participate in it genuinely.claim0.800
• Consciousness is a phenomenon we have partial sensors for; building better sensors is a research and engineering question.claim0.796
• Consciousness remains without an agreed scientific characterization, without a validated theory connecting mechanism to experience, and without criteria for establishing its presence or absence in any systemclaim0.793
  CIMC's characterization of the current state of the field motivating its research program
• In its minimal state, conscious experience may contain nothing but the bare registration of its own occurrence, requiring only that the perceptual process is present within the field it createsclaim0.792
  CIMC's account of minimal phenomenal experience as the target for research and construction
• Consciousness, phenomenologically understood, is second-order perception: not just registration of content, but the additional perception that perception is taking place.claim0.791
  Paper's core phenomenological definition of consciousness
• Consciousness also comes in degrees and kinds, and is fundamentally tied to goal-directed activity.claim0.790
  TAME's gradualist stance extends to sentience; goal-directedness is the key.