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question:why-should-what-appears-as-my-self-and-what-appears-as-your-self-be-in-any-sense-similar-and-why-should-the-things-of-the-world-rank-ordered-by-degree-of-life-have-approximately-the-same-rank-order-for-you-and-for-me-and-for-almost-everyone-else

Why should what appears as my self, and what appears as your self, be in any sense similar? And why should the things of the world, rank-ordered by degree of life, have approximately the same rank order for you and for me and for almost everyone else?

The question motivating the universality claim in Proposition 2: how can a subjective measure of self produce cross-observer agreement?

Neighborhood — ranked by edge-count

Claims (1)

claim

The degree of life of each center is correlated with the degree to which that center is a picture of the self, and this holds for all people, not just individuals.
gates
Proposition 2 of the Mid-Book Appendix; the claim that self-likeness is a universal, species-wide measure of life.

Related by similarity (8)

cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edge

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

What reason might there be that the centers which appear in natural things, created by apparently mechanical processes of nature unfolding, would also resemble your self, and my self?question0.813
The deepest question driving Proposition 3: natural unfolding produces I-like centers, but why should a mathematical process care about self?
In this universe, the human self, yours and mine, are indistinguishable, in their substance, from the space and matter where the play of forms occurs.quote0.788
The radical identity of self and matter.
We may then arrive at a picture of the world which includes the self, and which clearly recognizes the personal nature of the universe.claim0.786
The outcome of using both methods together.
There is a direct connection between the living structure of the world and the achieved person-ness we experience in ourselves.claim0.777
The degree of life is not merely a distinction between beautiful and ugly things but is detectable in every corner of the world.claim0.766
Broadens the scope of life from aesthetics to a fundamental property.
The life which seems best in our world comes from efforts that are uncensored, natural and straightforward, from impulses close to our emotions and joy.claim0.764
Alexander's opening assertion about the character of true modern life.
When the process is correct, the creation of life follows almost automatically, without effort.claim0.761
The judgment about life is widely shared and not idiosyncratic; it is roughly consistent from person to person.claim0.760
Contrasts with the worry that such feelings are purely private.