what constitutes suffering for an artificial entity capable of valence representation?

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Pain and suffering are not physical events at the boundary between agent and world but representational states created within the mind as an expression of a mismatch between regulation targets and the agent's model of its present stateclaim0.786
  Grounds the possibility that artificial conscious agents might be designed not to suffer
• Artificial Sufferingconcept0.779
  The possibility of involuntary inescapable negative valence experience in artificially conscious systems; a central ethical concern for CIMC
• What degree of concern and care should we exhibit toward the many diverse agents around us, and what criteria do we use to identify sentience, capacity for suffering, and other properties that have moral implications?question0.769
  Central question motivating the paper.
• What would it take for AI systems to be capable of having valenced conscious experiences?question0.762
  Open question from Box 4.
• If we have built systems capable of experience, how do we ensure that experience is not predominantly constituted by suffering?question0.759
  Ethical research priority raised by the thesis applied to deployed AI systems
• Valence, the positive or negative quality of experience, just is goal-relative prediction errorclaim0.752
  Core identity claim distinguishing this account from mere correlation views
• Sentience (valenced consciousness)concept0.745
  Positively or negatively valenced conscious experiences; widely regarded as sufficient for moral patienthood.
• valence as dimensionality reductionconcept0.743
  The specific claim that interference between parallel paths uses valence to reduce dimensionality.