Given two versions of a building, A and B, can we tell empirically which one has more life, in a way which allows people to reach agreement — that is to say, objectively?

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Value in architecture can be objective and real, not merely subjective; the degree of life in buildings is a fact that can be observed.claim0.818
  A direct challenge to the second and third tacit assumptions, fundamental to Alexander's view of building.
• If a building is made by a process that allows fine adaptation through feedback, it will have life; if built from fixed drawings, it will not.hypothesis0.817
  Predictive conditional summarizing the chapter's argument.
• Most of the possible building configurations are dead ones; they do not have life.claim0.812
• A building can have real life only when the building details have life and are adapted, in their fine structure, to the life of the building.claim0.811
  Life at larger scales depends on life at the fine scale.
• The feeling that there is more life in one case than another is correlated with a structural difference in the things themselves, which can be made precise and measured.claim0.808
  Forward‑looking claim that the life quality has an objective basis, to be demonstrated later.
• The existence of widely agreed‑upon lists of great buildings suggests a shared perception of life in buildings.claim0.807
  Argues for intersubjective agreement about the quality of life.
• Arch A has more life than Arch B, reflected in the more coherent structure of its wholeness.claim0.804
  Aesthetic judgment of the two arch drawings, illustrating that life can be objectively assessed through the structure of centers.
• Life, as it occurs in buildings or in works of art, can be measured, but only by a method that relies on the degree of development or enlightenment of the observer.claim0.803
  The fundamental methodological conclusion of the chapter.