A larger mind that is more conscious in the relevant sense could contain a greater amount of maximally-intense hedonic experience than a smaller mind

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• Theory of Mind is a subset of cognitive abilities enabled by consciousness, not its equivalent; consciousness is a prerequisite for ToM, but ToM is not the entirety of consciousness.claim0.797
  Theoretical clarification distinguishing ToM from consciousness to frame the study's approach.
• In its minimal state, conscious experience may contain nothing but the bare registration of its own occurrence, requiring only that the perceptual process is present within the field it createsclaim0.786
  CIMC's account of minimal phenomenal experience as the target for research and construction
• "There is no truly monadic, indivisible yet cognitive being: all known minds reside in physical systems composed of components of various complexity and active behavior."concept0.785
• AI systems which possess more of the indicator properties are more likely to be conscious.claim0.780
  Graded claim about the rubric.
• Consciousness is prior to and independent of personal ownership or individual minds.claim0.775
• Consciousness and capacity for suffering may be distributed across multiple scales within composite beings, not limited to single 'I'.claim0.772
• Consciousness is not the result of mental architecture and cognitive ability, but its prerequisite — a necessary precondition for complex learning and intelligent behavior.claim0.772
  Genesis Hypothesis claim that consciousness forms before rather than from cognition
• If welfare grows more slowly than cost with mind scale, greatest total welfare would be obtained by building vast numbers of tiny minds, implying insect populations may already overwhelm humans in aggregate welfarehypothesis0.771
  One of two scaling hypotheses examined for the mind-scale dimension