claim
active
claim:functional-emotions-do-not-imply-llms-have-subjective-experienceFunctional emotions do not imply LLMs have subjective experience
Explicit caution.
Source paper
extracted_from(2026) · Nicholas Sofroniew · Isaac Kauvar · William Saunders · Runjin Chen +12
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Papers (1)
paper
Questions (2)
question
- Explicitly neither resolved nor depended on.
- Left open.
Related by similarity (8)
cosine ≥ 0.65 · no typed edgeEntities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.
- Core definition.
- Internal representations encoding emotion concepts in large language models, identified by probing and SAE methods
- Interprets the Sofroniew et al. findings within the Level 2 indicator table.
- We hypothesize that persistently active emotional state representations exist in LLMs but may be missed by standard probing methods.hypothesis0.758Open hypothesis from the Anthropic paper that motivates this work
- Key finding.
- Chalmers' interpretivist framework adopted for Level 1 assessment.
- Illustrates how the same empirical finding is read differently by computational functionalists and organismic functionalists.
- Question raised by Anthropic and partially addressed by this paper's persistence evidence