For some purposes, it will be convenient to settle for specifications in terms of fulfilling internal commitments, and sometimes the public character of promises will have to be taken into account in the specifications.

Entities in the same semantic neighborhood but without a typed relation to this one — candidates for new edges or unrecognized duplicates.

• Commitments are like specifications, but they are to be considered as dynamic, i.e. specific commitments are created as the program runs.claim0.826
  Dynamic nature of commitments.
• We also propose to handle external obligations in an abstract way.claim0.814
  Proposal for type 1/type 2 obligations.
• Austin points out that uttering a promise creates an obligation in a public sense. This will be important also for computer programs, since a promise by the program may create an obligation, perhaps legal, on the part of the organization operating the program.claim0.809
  Importation of Austin's idea to programs.
• Proving that a program meets accomplishment specifications must be based on assumptions about the world, the information it makes available to the program and the effects of the program's actions as well as on facts about the program itself.claim0.793
  Claim about the nature of accomplishment verification.
• What type 1 and type 2 obligations are, e.g. the legal requirements they impose, how they are to be treated when they conflict with other considerations, and the consequences of their non-fulfillment, is subject to institutional definition.claim0.791
  Claim that obligation types are institution-dependent.
• Perhaps we will need three levels of specification, internal, input-output and accomplishment.hypothesis0.788
  Speculation about specification hierarchy.
• Programs that engage in commercial transactions assume obligations on behalf of their owners in exchange for obligations assumed by other entities. It may be part of the specifications of an Elephant 2000 programs that these obligations are exchanged as intended, and this too can be expressed by a logical sentence.claim0.787
  Sixth abstract claim.
• "[W]e must confess that perception, and what depends upon it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons... when inspecting its interior, we will find only parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception."quote0.783
  Canonical illustration of the Hard Problem intuition that any functional/mechanical explanation faces an explanatory gap for perception