A sensory anomaly (sticker mismatch) can itself become an intrinsic drive for action under active inference, even without external reward

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• The sticker-removal behavior induced by the self-prior corresponds to stimulus-elicited intention rather than endogenous intention, aligning with the developmental view of early intentional agencyclaim0.794
  Connects the model's behavior to Zaadnoordijk and Bayne's taxonomy of intentional agency
• "[W]e must confess that perception, and what depends upon it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons... when inspecting its interior, we will find only parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception."quote0.750
  Canonical illustration of the Hard Problem intuition that any functional/mechanical explanation faces an explanatory gap for perception
• In active inference, reward can simply be treated as another observation we have a preference over, rather than a special signal.claim0.749
  Abstract; central distinction.
• The natural curiosity emerging in active inference contrasts with handcrafted exploration in reinforcement learning such as epsilon-greedy or ad hoc novelty bonuses.claim0.746
  §2, comparing exploration mechanisms.
• The sensitivity to think/don't think instructions may be achieved via a circuit that tags tokens as attention-worthy based on instructions or incentiveshypothesis0.746
  Mechanism for how the model modulates representation strength.
• Passing a sticker-bearing latent through the self-prior removes the sticker in reconstruction, confirming distribution favors sticker-free statefinding0.745
  Shows the self-prior's generative distribution rejects sticker-bearing states
• Active inference agents can learn their own reward function (prior preferences) by interacting with the environment, bypassing the need for an explicit reward signal.claim0.743
  Abstract and §3, preference learning section.
• Integration and collective action (basal cognition) mechanisms enact the functional relationships necessary for new individuality.hypothesis0.741
  Proposes biological mechanisms implementing non-decomposable functions in developmental individuality.